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Depression so very different from ordinary recessions? Existing theory was not very convincing in explaining the difference. So I invented --or so I thought --the debtdeflation hypothesis. After Northwestern I got a fellowship to go to the Brookings Institution for a year and began to talk about my debt-deflation idea with various people, including, for example, James Tobin. But nobody told me that the debt-deflation idea had been already been done by Irving Fisher because that part of his work had been totally forgotten. Remember Fisher ruined his reputation during the Great Depression by having previously claimed that the stock market was on a permanently high plateau. His book and paper on debt-deflation (and the paper is much better than the book) were his own ex post rationalisation of why he had been wrong.
ii So I followed the debt-deflation track for the better part of a year looking for flow of funds data that I needed (but didn't then exist).
Then one day I was talking with David Meiselman about my thesis and he said that he seemed to recall that Irving Fisher had already written something similar to my idea. He suggested that I check the early years of Econometrica to find Fisher's paper, and sure enough, there it was! But that turned out not to be a catastrophe for me because by then my question had changed from accounting for the historical uniqueness of the Great Depression to the question of why couldn't debt-deflation happen in any of the macro models that I had been taught or read about? It could not happen because they all worked with consolidated balance sheets. In the Modigliani- Clower's 1965 paper on the 'Keynesian Counter-revolution'.
Snowdon: So what is On Keynesiam Economics and the Economics of Keynes all about?
Leijonhufvud: The book is essentially about the kind of information questions that do not occur in neoclassical Walrasian general equilibrium models. The issues I was dealing with had to do with how information and communication flow in the system so as to enable a coordinated solution to be achieved. This is an issue that I keep coming back to in my work. In particular I was interested in finding some answers to the question…When and why does the capitalist market system sometimes fail? This involved putting two sacred cows on a collision course because the combination of microeconomics and macroeconomics that was taught in the 1960s was totally incoherent. I felt passionately about it at the time. I also thought it was scandalous, and still do, that people perpetuate the falsehood that Keynes's General Theory and Keynesian economics is all about rigid wages.
Snowdon:
But surely the idea of rigid wages being the essence of Keynes is very much associated with Modigliani and his famous 1944 Econometrica paper? In response to a question about this paper that was put to Modigliani in October, 1997, 6 he replied… 'I feel I was absolutely right in saying that the essence of Keynesian economics is wage rigidity'.
iii You have already said how much you admire
Modigliani's contribution to economics but you clearly disagree with him on this important point.
Leijonhufvud: Yes, and this was a great embarrassment to me because I have so much respect and affection for Franco Modigliani (I felt the same about John Hicks whom I met later). Errors in that decision tree were sometimes apparent only a long time afterwards.
That's exactly why those who are working at the frontier of the subject should know some history of economic thought. This is a different reason than just wanting to know the history of the subject for antiquarian interest. This view also suggests that economics itself exhibits very strong path dependence. So if you take the wrong path the errors can be with you for a long time.
The neoclassical synthesis is a good example of this because the confusion caused by thinking that it was sticky nominal wages after all that lay at the heart of the unemployment problem led to an impoverishment of the models that economists were working with. From that point onwards people looked at the IS-LM framework as simply a theory of nominal income. All you need, to talk about short-run unemployment, is nominal income and the inherited sticky wage. psychologically averse to running with some herd, or even breeding a herd of my own. Years ago I used to have some students at UCLA who wanted to do 'Leijonhufvudian economics' but I was always suspicious of them. I always did better with more independent minded students. But I do remain very much influenced by this Keynesian business. If I was to describe my interests, to identify the questions that concern me, then almost everything that I have written has to do with the key question: …What are the limits to the self-organising, self-coordinating capabilities of the market system? And the reason for not being in any particular group has to do with the fact that the economics profession tends to split into groups that vary endogenously in size over time. We have people who will say that today's view is that the private sector works perfectly well except when the government messes things up.
We used to have the opposing view which argued that the private sector is inherently defective and cannot co-ordinate activities except with the help of the visible hand of government. I think that both of those views are quite dangerous and in many ways not a little stupid as a description of the world we live in. So I am instinctively averse to both those views apart from having rational reasons to reject both positions.
Macroeconomics has undergone some dramatic changes during your career as an economist. Have you changed your mind on any issues relating to and therefore has to be done by discretionary policy. I think that is simply untrue, it is an exaggeration. I think it is true that we can get into situations where the system can fail and where just waiting for it to recover spontaneously would be to court disaster.
Keynes was right about those situations. But Joan Robinson and company stuck to the hard-line Keynesian position about the inherent failures of the capitalist system and if you get doctrinaire like that, and you are wrong, then sooner or later your position will be shattered and the table will be swept clean of your ideas. In his own day he was very much concerned about the position of his own country in the international system. From the beginning Keynes (1919) is not possible to make a deal by saying: 'I have this investment project that will pay off in the future and I want to trade that prospect for the factors of production today necessary to produce those future goods'. And that's where we end up if the financial system is totally clogged up with bad loans. That has been and still is the Japanese situation. If the problem was the conventional Keynesian one (of consumers being cash-constrained) then there is a rationale for public works. But that was never the Japanese problem. Their problem was that they did not move directly to clean up the banking system after the collapse of the real estate and stock market bubble. They did engage in conventional Keynesian policies but all that accomplished was to run up a large public debt which is now constraining their policy options.
Snowdon: What is it that draws you to this idea of ' the corridor'?
Leijonhufvud: I have always had a fascination with extremes of monetary instability.
I have spent years studying high inflations and find it extremely interesting, also from a purely theoretical point of view, to see how thoroughly coordination is disrupted.
The majority of economists hold the view that the system works exceedingly well but I prefer to think of economies as complex dynamical systems. Complex in two senses. He asked me to come and at that time, in the mid-1970s, I thought that economists did not know what they were talking about when discussing the costs of inflation. There was a total lack of understanding on this issue. The general doctrine that the social costs of inflation related to the shoe leather costs is ridiculous. If inflation is that trivial then let it rip….who cares? So this is an area where economic theory remains totally incoherent and I think this is an intellectual scandal. But the paper that I wrote for the S'Agaro conference is one of my worst papers because it was written in a bad temper. Later, I had this brilliant Argentinean student, Daniel Heymann, and eventually we decided to write something together about high inflation and how 20 inflation impacts on growth and real variables. This is not something that can be treated by fatuous statements that money must be non-neutral during high inflations.
You need to understand why the price mechanism, the market system, does not work in the same way during high inflations as in normal times. You cannot understand this problem by writing down a non-monetary general equilibrium model, grafting money onto it, and then play around with different rates of inflation tax. Step back from inflation targeting -as I believe we sooner or later must -and the independence issue will have to be re-evaluated. 
Snowdon: Should modern growth theorists read more economic history?
Leijonhufvud: I share the view that economic history can contribute a great deal to our understanding of economic growth. It seems to me that once the Cobb-Douglass production function was invented no economist has since studied production in the way that Alfred Marshall (1919) did in his Industry and Trade. Taking derivatives of production functions tells you nothing about production. So if you are really serious 24 about wanting to understand the modern world, and how we got to where we are, you should read people like David Landes (1998), Eric Jones (1988) and Nathan Rosenberg (1994) . I do think that, to some extent, the revival of interest in growth theory will lead people back to economic history and hopefully many will get hooked.
Snowdon:
In several papers you have emphasised the importance of understanding the full implications of the 'Smithian' division of labour and the phenomenon of increasing returns in production. This is something that both Keynes and most
Keynesians have neglected. vii Why is this important for the macroeconomics agenda?
Leijonhufvud: I firmly believe that there are increasing returns everywhere arising from the entire network of cooperation in production and the division of labour.
Unfortunately mainstream macroeconomics insists on using a production theory that has the Ricardian farm as the representative unit of production. So we are seen to always live in a world of constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to the variable factor. I prefer to think of production in terms of Smithian factories --price setting firms that operate under conditions of increasing returns to scale. The productivity of labour increases with the division of labour -and the division of labour depends on the extent of the market. This has all sorts of interesting implications. Okun's Law is one. Another example relates to real business cycle theory and the pro-cyclical pattern of productivity that we observe in the Solow residual. I start from the notion that the division of labour gives us increasing returns and we therefore live in a system where it is impossible to scale back production and scale down inputs in the same way. So the system is always inefficient at low levels of activity but very productive at high levels of activity. Therefore, any cyclical theory should imply pro-cyclical productivity. But in this Smithian world the line of 25 causation is from increases in the level of aggregate activity to changes in productivity and not as the real business cycle theorists argue from productivity to aggregate activity. The fact that there is no pattern in real wages is consistent with this although it is a problem for standard theory. When people start from the Solow growth model they find that the residual is sixty per cent of it. This very important fact ought to make us rethink the fundamentals of production theory rather than taking the 'Truth' of the neoclassical production function as established so that what remains is to tinker with it to "save the phenomena", for example, by modifying the measured labour input to take into account years of schooling and so on and so forth. expectations while others will focus on the mistakes that were made. The point to make for economists, I believe, is that whichever position one takes on that, the implication is that we did not (and do not) understand the world we live in very well.
So we have much to learn but it does not seem to me that the profession as a whole is jumping at the opportunity.
One more point perhaps. Appraisals of transitions tend to run in terms of beforeand-after comparisons of GDP and mortality statistics. Not enough attention has been given to the legitimacy of the distributions of income and wealth resulting from the privatisations. There is no coherent set of values that lends rhyme or reason to the distribution of wealth that the transition has wrought in Russia. This, I think, spells trouble down the road. 
REFLECTIONS ON TWENTIETH CENTURY MACROECONOMICS

Snowdon:
You have surveyed the post-war macroeconomic debates using your 'Swedish Flag' taxonomy (Leijonhufvud, 1983a , 1992 . This taxonomy classifies aggregate fluctuations in a 2 x 2 matrix distinguishing between impulse and propagation mechanisms that can be either real or nominal. Now we have nominal frictions being added to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models and 28 Goodfriend and King (1997) were ruled out of court in the early days of rational expectations-but learning is adaptation nonetheless. It may be 'procedurally rational' but it is not going to be 'substantively rational' in the sense of Herb Simon. This stuff is encouraging from my point of view although these developments have a long way to go before they get back to the issues raised by Keynes, namely, given the institutional structure of the macroeconomy, will it always produce the market signals that will guide all the errorlearning adaptation in the direction of general equilibrium.
What would a future economics not built on optimisation and equilibrium look like?
Leijonhufvud: A central component of it will have to be a behavioural economics that studies, in particular, how people cope in complex environments despite their cognitive limitations. Experimental economics is then bound to grow steadily more important to us. I also believe that institutional economics has to be approached from this cognitive perspective, that is to say, that economic institutions have to be seen as 30 structured so as to simplify the decision problems of boundedly rational agents.
Economists don't know much about how different kinds of markets actually work.
The empirical study of market processes has to be given more importance. The modelling of such processes will be done by computer simulation. Similarly, agentbased computer modelling is the only feasible way to build macrostructures from experimental and behavioural microeconomics so that such complex dynamic systems can be investigated in a systematic fashion. Such a reorientation of economic theory is apt also to change the kind of mathematics that economists will rely on. Recursive functions, for example, will be used not just as a method of solving dynamic programming problems but to model adaptive behaviour. The Intensive Graduate
Courses ("Summer Schools") that we have run at the Computable and Experimental
Economics Laboratory of Trento University have pursued these approaches. 
In his recent survey of the development of macroeconomics in the twentieth century, Olivier Blanchard's (2000) suggests that 'progress in macroeconomics may well be the success story of twentieth century economics'.
Furthermore, he argues that economists who present the history of this development as a series of 'battles, revolutions and counter-revolutions' convey the wrong image.
The right image, according to Blanchard is 'of a steady accumulation of knowledge'.
As an economist who has used the word 'revolutions' when discussing the history of macroeconomics (Leijonhufvud, 1976) , how do you react to Blanchard's assessment?
Leijonhufvud: Blanchard may be thinking of the steady accumulation of analytical techniques perhaps. But as for our understanding of the world, economists at one time thought the economy stable as long as the government did not interfere; later, the common belief was that the private sector was unstable, but could be stabilized by a wise and benevolent government; later still, the consensus view has been that the 31 private sector would take care of itself quite perfectly and that business fluctuations can only be understood as caused by the time-inconsistent blundering of government.
And that particular pendulum of professional opinion is presumably poised to reverse course yet again. Or consider how Friedman's monetarist theory of the cycle won out over Keynes's real cycle hypothesis, only to be undermined by Lucas's unanticipated money hypothesis and then replaced by Prescott's real business cycle theory which came to dominate just in time to usher in a decade of spectacular financial crises. I see no monotonic approach to 'Truth' in this story. And surely there were 'battles' along the way.
